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Introduction
For years, marriage was a union between a male and a female.2  No controversy 
existed about the definition of marriage, and no one tried to change the definition to 
include same-sex couples.  Recently, however, in many states in the United States and in 
many foreign countries, there has been substantial momentum to include same-sex 
couples in the institution of marriage.3
In several countries this momentum has resulted in a change in the law.  In the 
Netherlands, in other Northern European countries, and in Vermont and Massachusetts in 
the United States, the law has been changed either to include same-sex unions in 
marriage or to provide an alternative law to give same-sex couples the same benefits as 
marriage.4
In Canada, an Ontario court recently held that the definition of marriage that restricts 
the union to a man and a woman violates the country’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
Immediately after the ruling, the city of Toronto issued full marriage licenses to same-sex 
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 Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Willamette University College of Law.
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 In Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 312, 191 NW2d 185, 186, appeal dismissed 409 US 810, 93 S Ct 37, 
34 L Ed 2d 65 (1972), the court states that “The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, 
uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of 
Genesis.”
3 See Baker v. Nelson supra note2; see also Comment, Inching Down the Aisle:  Differing Paths Toward 
the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and Europe, 116 HARVARD L. REV. 2004 (May 
2003).  This article chronicles recent developments in the move to recognize same-sex unions as marriages.
4 See MERIN, YUVAL, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES, THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF GAY 
PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, The University of Chicago Press, 2002.  The recent 
case of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, ____Mass._____, _____NE2d_____, 2003 WL 
22701313 (November 18, 2003), held the marriage law that restricts marriage to a man and a woman 
violates the state constitution.
couples that applied.5  Then the Canadian Cabinet approved a policy to open marriage to 
same-sex couples.
The definition of marriage is changing to give same-sex couples the protection 
afforded by marriage laws to heterosexual couples.  Whether that protection means 
expansion of the definition of marriage or affording the same-sex couple the same 
protection but through a different means varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  In some 
cases, the change may be occurring through incremental changes in the law to allow 
same-sex couples insurance benefits, death benefits and other kinds of protection 
normally reserved to spouses.6  The jurisdiction may be providing the benefits of 
marriage but without giving official approval to the relationship.
Given the variation in the approaches taken for this change, conflicts in the law 
are inevitable.  For instance, if one state in the United States recognizes same-sex 
marriage or a domestic partnership and another state does not, a conflict-of-laws arises 
5 See www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/162/nation/Ontario (June 11, 2003.)  The Globe reported:  If the ruling 
is not appealed to Canada’s Supreme Court—and the government of Prime Minister Jean Chretien seemed 
disinclined yesterday to mount a legal challenge—Ontario will become the first province or state in North 
America to legalize gay marriage, and all of Canada could follow suit as early as next year.  Vermont and 
Quebec allow civil unions, a legal registration, rather than marriage.  Advocates of same-sex marriages say 
that civil unions have second-class legal status.  But the Vermont law provides members of a civil union 
“the same benefits, protections, and responsibilities under Vermont law…as are granted to spouses in a 
marriage,” and according to the Vermont secretary of state’s office.  Supporters said the Ontario ruling 
would have implications elsewhere.  “The Ontario ruling is hugely significant because it could spur similar 
civil rights advances in the United States,” said Evan Wolfson, executive director of Freedom to Marry, a 
New York-based group that supports gay and lesbian marriage.  “The Canadians aren’t settling for lesser 
steps, such as civil union, but demanding the real deal.  Americans will look north to Canada and see that 
the sky isn’t falling when gays and lesbian couples wed.” The OREGONIAN reported on Wednesday, June 
18, 2003, that Canada has joined the ranks of Belgium and the Netherlands as the only countries to allow 
same-sex unions.  The OREGONIAN, June 18, 2003, p. 1.  See also Halpern v. Toronto City, 2003 WL 34950 
(Ont. C.A.) 
6 See Comment, supra note 3.  The author comments:  In other ways, too, American courts have 
demonstrated a willingness to recognize same-sex relationships tacitly, without granting them official 
approval.  With growing frequency, courts in many jurisdictions have embraced a functional definition of 
family that looks to the roles individuals have assumed rather than to whether those individuals conform to 
strict legal definitions of ‘spouse’ or ‘family member.’  Such decisions recognize the marriage-like qualities 
of same-sex relationships in all but name, and, in many cases, arise not just out of a pragmatic recognition 
that times have changed and that society’s moral strictures—once universally intolerant of sexual 
difference—have relaxed. (Citations omitted.)
when a couple whose union has been affirmed in one state moves to a state that does not 
recognize same-sex unions.  The same kind of conflict arises in situations where same-
sex couples travel from countries that recognize such unions to countries that do not.  For 
example, a couple who marries in the Netherlands and travels to the United States or to 
another European country may ask a court to affirm the same-sex union to provide one or 
both of the partners the benefit of the law.  How that conflict is resolved in either Europe 
or the United States is a significant question.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the conflicts issues raised by the 
differences in law regarding recognition of same- sex unions.  Part I of the paper describes 
the different ways that the law has developed.   Part II considers the conflicts issues that 
arise in the United States.  It considers the nature of the conflict and how it is likely to be 
resolved, and it includes discussion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense 
of Marriage Act, federal laws that impact the conflicts issue.7  Section III describes the 
international conflicts.  The section examines these conflicts from the perspective of a 
European state as well as an American state and focuses primarily on Europe and the 
United States.  Part IV offers a conclusion about the issues presented.
Part I:  History of the Development of Laws Recognizing Same-sex Relationships
There are three different approaches that jurisdictions have taken to providing 
legal protection for same-sex couples.  One approach is to redefine marriage to include 
same-sex couples as well as heterosexual couples.  A second approach is to provide a 
parallel partnership track to same-sex couples that offers the same kind of benefits as 
7
 The Full Faith and Credit Clause is found in the U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.  The Defense of Marriage Act is 
found at Pub.L.No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
marriage, but does not put the parties in the same position as they would be had they 
married.  The final approach is to adopt incremental legal changes that afford the same-
sex couple some of the economic and other benefits of marriage but do not fully sanction 
the relationship.  
A. Recognition of same-sex relationship as marriage
The Netherlands is the first country to give same-sex partners the right to marry.  The 
Dutch Parliament enacted a statute that gives same-sex couples protection equivalent to 
heterosexual couples.8  It earlier had accorded same-sex couples registration and 
partnership rights similar to those available in a number of states and countries today.
Then, in deciding to move from the partnership model to the marriage model, it  
decided, “same-sex couples can only be afforded equal treatment if they are allowed to 
enter into civil marriages.”9  The bill that eventually became law amends Article 30, 
Book 1 of the Netherlands Civil Code to read as follows:  
1. A marriage can be contracted by two persons of different sex or of the same sex.
2. The law only considers marriage in its civil relations.10
Two problems concerned the Parliamentary committee that recommended this sea 
change.  One concerned the presumption of parentage of children born during marriage 
and whether or not that presumption should apply to same-sex couples.  The legislation 
does not include that presumption for same-sex couples.  The other issue concerned the 
8
 Act of 21 December 2000 amending Book 1 of the Civil Code, concerning the opening up of marriage for 
persons of the same sex (Act on the Opening up of Marriage), Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden 2002, nr. 9 (11 January) (Official Journal of the Kingdom of the Netherlands).
9
 Kortmann Committee:  Unanimous when It Comes to Protecting Children, Divided over Legal Form for 
Couples, October 28, 1997, http://www.minjust.nl:8080/c_actual/persber/pb0176.htm.
10
 Kamerstukken II, 1998/99, 26 672.  
international recognition of Dutch marriages in other countries.  Parliament limited 
marriage to Dutch citizens.11   Belgium became the second country to legalize same-sex 
marriage, but unlike the Netherlands, it does not allow gay and lesbian couples to adopt 
children.12
Recently, in Canada, the Ontario Appeal Court issued a decision that declares 
prohibitions against homosexual marriage unconstitutional.13  In making its decision, the 
court ruled that the “existing common law definition of marriage violates equality rights 
on the basis of sexual orientation under the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part of 
the Canadian Constitution.”14  A court in British Columbia has ordered the federal 
Parliament to revise the definition of marriage by July 2004 or the court will change the 
definition to include same-sex couples.15  Recent newspaper reports indicate that the 
government has decided not to appeal the case and will instead draft and send to 
Parliament the necessary legislation to modify the marriage laws to include same-sex 
unions.
Several states in the United States have considered the question of the 
constitutionality of restricting marriage to heterosexual unions.  Courts in Hawaii and 
11
 Maxwell, Nancy, Opening Civil Marriage to Same-Gender Couples:  A Netherlands—United States 
Comparison, 4.3 EJCL November 2000.  
12 See www.religooustolerance.org/hom_mar10.htm.
13 See http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/162/nation/Ontario_court. The article, written by Colin 
Nickerson, of the Boston Globe staff, states “The ruling in Ontario, Canada’s most populous province, puts 
pressure on Chretien’s Liberal Party government to either revise Canada’s marriage law or simply let stand 
recent court rulings declaring that the present legal definition of marriage is unconstitutional.  If it does not 
challenge the rulings, gay and lesbian marriage will become legal by default, as happened with abortion in 
Canada.  The Appeal Court ruling added muscle to decisions this year by courts in British Columbia and 
Quebec that also challenged the law defining marriage.  However, Ontario went far beyond the other courts 
with the unequivocal order to allow immediate gay and lesbian marriages.  The court also ordered Ontario 
to retroactively recognize the January 2001 marriage of Joe Varnell and Kevin Bourassa, a gay couple wed 
in a Toronto church ceremony despite the refusal of the city to grant them a license.”  Halpern v. Toronto 
City, 2003 WL 34950 (Ont. C.A.).
14 Id.
15 Id.
Alaska held that the restriction of marriage to heterosexual unions is unconstitutional, but 
subsequent state constitutional amendments made the decisions moot.16
A state superior court decision in Massachusetts held that the right to marry is one 
that is deeply rooted in our history and tradition.  It may be restricted to heterosexual 
marriage as it has been throughout our history.  There is no constitutional requirement to 
include homosexual marriage within the tradition of marriage.17  The court says the 
appropriate means of redress is through the Legislature, not through the courts.18
Recently, the Massachusetts Supreme Court struck down the lower court decision.19
In holding that the marriage laws violate the Massachusetts State Constitution, the Court 
stated:  
We declare that barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and
obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would marry a
person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts law.  We declare that barring
an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage
solely because that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the
Massachusetts Constitution.  We vacate the summary judgment for the 
Department.  We remand this case to the Superior Court for entry of judgment 
consistent with this opinion.  Entry of judgment shall be stayed for 180 days to 
permit the Legislature to take such action as it may deem appropriate in light of 
this opinion.20
16 See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. 
1998); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reh’g granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993), 
remanded to Baehr  v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996), aff’d, 950 P.2d 
1234 (Haw. 1997); see Alaska Const. art I, § 25 (adopted 1998); Haw. Const. art. I, § 23 (adopted 1998).
17 See Goodridge et al. v. Department of Public Health, 2002 WL 1299135 (Mass. Super.)  In denying the 
petitioner’s request, the court says:  Thus, based on the history discussed above and actions of the people’s 
elected representatives, this court cannot conclude that “a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the 
traditions and collective conscience of our people that failure to recognize it would violate the fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political institution.  Neither…is a 
right to same-sex marriage…implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice 
would exist if it were sacrificed.”  (Citations omitted.)  While this court understands the reasons for the 
plaintiffs’ request to reverse the Commonwealth’s centuries-old legal tradition of restricting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples, their request should be directed to the Legislature, not the courts.
18 Id.
19 See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, supra note 4.
20 See Decision, p. 14.
In a recent addition to the opinion as requested by the state Legislature, the court clarified 
its previous decision and stated that the new law must give same-sex couples the right to 
marry, not an equivalent right to enter into a civil union, as the Legislature in Vermont 
created for its same-sex couples.21
B.  Recognition of Same-Sex Relationship as a Partnership
A number of jurisdictions, both foreign and one within the United States, opted to 
create a partnership track parallel to marriage that offers the same-sex couple much, if not 
all, the protection available to a married couple.
       Several Northern European countries, including Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark have provided protection to same-sex couples for a number of years.22
Generally, the same-sex partnerships have the same rights and responsibilities accorded 
to married partners.  There are some restrictions, including qualifying for adoption and 
for registration of a partnership.23  The option is generally available only to those who are 
residents in the country.24  There is typically a reciprocal recognition provision that 
provides for recognition of the partnerships in other Northern European countries.25
Traditionally, in the United States the regulation of marriage and family is a matter 
that has been left to the states.  The U.S. Constitution and the protection it accords to its 
citizens restrict the states in their regulation.26  But the states decide what the 
21
 Goodridge, supra note 4, states that the solution of creating a civil union for gay and lesbian couples 
similar to what was created in Vermont is not consistent with the Court’s holding.  Gay and lesbian couples 
are entitled to marry according to what the court says.
22
 Merin, Yuval, supra, note 4.
23 Id. at pp 61-110.
24 Id. at 238-239.
25 Id.
26 See Mark Strasser, Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions:  On Meaning, Free Exercise, and 
Constitutional Guarantees, 33 LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW JOURNAL 597 (Spring 2002).  In this 
requirements for marriage, for divorce, for adoption, and for other family matters should 
be, including decisions about the regulation of same-sex unions.  
In the United States, Vermont adopted our nation’s first civil union law that extends 
to same-sex couples virtually all of the rights and responsibilities of marriage.  In Baker 
v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court held it a violation of the Common Benefits Clause 
in its state constitution not to accord same-sex couples the same kind of protection 
accorded to heterosexual couples through the marriage law.27  The court admonished the 
Legislature to make these benefits and responsibilities available to same-sex couples.  
The Legislature responded by enacting the Civil Union Law.  In this law, the manner of 
recognition and the benefits conferred are the same as for marriage.28  The law provides 
for a civil or religious ceremony to create the union and also provides that the procedure 
for dissolution of the union is identical to the procedure for marriage.29  In all other 
respects, the union is like a marriage in that the partners have rights to support, have 
rights to inherit from the other spouse and may not be married or in another civil union 
while a part of this civil union.30  The law also makes it clear that a couple may travel 
from another jurisdiction and celebrate a civil union ceremony in Vermont.31
article, the author discusses the Supreme Court case of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), where the 
U.S. Supreme Court found a Virginia statute that prohibited marriages between parties of different races to 
be violative of their federal constitutional rights.  
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 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 
(codified at Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit.15, Sections 1201-1207 (Supp. 2001). 
28
 Silverman, Lewis A., Vermont Civil Unions, Full Faith and Credit, and Marital Status, 89 KENTUCKY 
LAW JOURNAL 1075,1079, (2000-2001) (The Legislature, in its response, ultimately created a new creature: 
the civil union.  Although the state’s marriage statute was clarified to define marriage as specifically 
between a male and a female, the Legislature went further.  It created a new type of quasi-marriage that 
granted to same-sex couples entering a civil union all the benefits of marriage granted by state law to any 
other married Vermont couple.)
29 Id. at 1080-81.
30
 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91.  The Act provides:  The family court shall have jurisdiction over all 
proceedings relating to the dissolution of civil unions.  The dissolution of civil unions shall follow the same 
procedures and be subject to the same substantive rights and obligations that are involved in the dissolution 
of marriage in accordance with chapter 11 of this title, including any residency requirements.   Vt. Stat. 
C. Partial recognition of rights for same-sex couples
Many other jurisdictions in the United States as well as in Europe offer more limited 
protection to same-sex couples.  Though the jurisdiction may not embrace the 
relationship fully as it has in places like Vermont and the Netherlands, the law provides 
some protection to same-sex couples.
For instance, Hawaii has enacted a reciprocal beneficiary system that provides certain 
protections to same-sex couples.32  A number of other states and municipalities have 
domestic partnership registries that grant same-sex couples benefits ranging from 
symbolic recognition to economic rights.33  Additionally, a number of states have allowed 
Ann. Tit. 15, § 1206 (2000).  Section 1204 provides:  The law of domestic relations, including annulment, 
separation and divorce, child custody and support, and property division and maintenance shall apply to 
parties to a civil union.  The Act also provides:  For a civil union to be established in Vermont, it shall be 
necessary that the parties to a civil union satisfy all of the following criteria:  (1) Not be a party to another 
civil union or marriage.  2) Be of the same sex and therefore excluded from the marriage laws of this state. 
(3) Meet the criteria and obligations set forth in 18 V.S.A. ch. 106.  Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 15, § 1202 (Supp. 
2000).
31
 Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 18, § 5160 (a) (2000) provides: The license shall be issued by the clerk of the town 
where either party resides or, if neither is a resident of the state, by any town clerk in the state.
32
 Haw. Rev. Stat. Ch. 572C-2 provides that the reciprocal beneficiaries may be covered by health 
insurance, may have hospital visitation and health care decision-making rights and may have the same 
rights as a spouse to a partner’s estate as well as a right to sue for the wrongful death of a partner.
33 Inching Down the Aisle:  Differing Paths Toward The Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United 
States and Europe, 116 HARVARD L. REV. 2004, 2015.  The article points out that states and municipalities 
have extended health insurance and other financial benefits to same-sex partners of their employees.  
Several municipalities require their contractors to do the same.  See also Carrillo-Heian, M.R., Domestic 
Partnership in California:  Is it a Step Toward Marriage?, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 475, 489 (2000).  The 
author explains how the domestic partnership law does not include the benefits of marriage, but offers some 
limited protection and benefit to same-sex couples and opposite sex couples 62 and older.  The author 
states:  “The requirements for entering into a DP (domestic partnership) under Chapter 588 are similar to 
the requirements for forming a marriage.  However, the rights and obligations that the status of marriage 
and the status of DP confer are markedly different.  The law generally favors married couples, providing 
them with inheritance rights, property rights, and tax benefits.  The rights and obligations that DP 
registration provides are wholly contained within the DP provisions of Chapter 588.  Similarly, the DP 
provisions in Chapter 588 are the only source of law governing the division of jointly-acquired property 
after termination of the DP, and the new law creates no new property rights.  In contrast, the Family Code 
contains an entire section detailing the rights and obligations of married couples, and another section 
governing the division of property upon dissolution.  Chapter 588 is silent on the subject of DPs that are 
registered under the laws of other jurisdictions.  An earlier version of the law did recognize such DPs, but 
this provision was omitted before enactment.  Conversely, marriages performed in other jurisdictions are 
valid in California.  If married couples travel or move outside of California, they enjoy substantially the 
same rights in the target state as they did in California, but if domestic partners travel outside of California, 
they become legal strangers to each other unless the target state recognizes California DPs as valid.  This 
gay and lesbian couples to adopt and to have some of the rights and responsibilities of 
parents and of family despite the fact that they cannot marry.34  Before Governor Gray 
Davis left office as California’s Governor, he signed a bill into law that takes effect on 
January 1, 2005.  This law expands the rights that Californians have under the Domestic 
Partnership law to something more like the rights recognized in Vermont’s Civil Union 
Law.35
The incremental approach, though not producing the full rights that same-sex couples 
desire, nevertheless has produced some protection.  Eventually, as these small changes 
occur, over time, they may give way to general acceptance and recognition of same-sex 
couples as entitled to the same rights as heterosexual couples.  This appears to be the 
direction that California has moved in its recent adoption of the California Domestic 
Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act.36
D.  Significance of the Recognition of Same-Sex Unions
The significance of the recognition of the same-sex union is important for economic 
as well as for status reasons. 
When the Vermont court decided Baker v. State, it highlighted some of the benefits of 
being married:  
phenomenon leads to unpleasant results if one partner is injured outside of California:  partners may not be 
entitled to visitation privileges or have any input concerning health care options.  (Citations omitted.)  
34 See id. at 116 HARVARD L.REV. 2020-2021.
35
 Chapter 421, A.B. 205, Civil Rights—The California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act. 
The Legislative Counsel’s Digest states:  This bill would extend the rights and duties of marriage to persons 
registered as domestic partners on and after January 1, 2005.  This bill would provide that the superior 
courts shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings governing the dissolution of domestic partnerships, 
nullity of domestic partnerships, and legal separation of partners in domestic partnerships.  These 
proceedings would follow the same procedures as the equivalent proceedings with respect to marriage.  The 
bill would provide that a legal union validly formed in another jurisdiction that is substantially equivalent 
to a domestic partnership would be recognized as a valid domestic partnership in this state.  
36 Id.
While the laws relating to marriage have undergone many changes during the last 
century, largely toward the goal of equalizing the status of husbands and wives, 
the benefits of marriage have not diminished in value.  On the contrary, the 
benefits and protections incident to a marriage license under Vermont law have 
never been greater.  They include, for example, the right to receive a portion of 
the estate of a spouse who dies intestate and protection against disinheritance 
through elective share provisions; preference in being appointed as the personal 
representative of a spouse who dies intestate; the right to bring a lawsuit for the 
wrongful death of a spouse; the right to bring an action for loss of consortium; the 
right to workers’ compensation survivor; the right to spousal benefits statutorily 
guaranteed to public employees, including health, life, disability, and accident 
insurance; the opportunity to be covered as a spouse under group life insurance 
policies issued to an employee; the opportunity to be covered as the insured’s 
spouse under an individual health insurance policy; the right to claim an 
evidentiary privilege for marital communications; homestead rights and 
protections; the presumption of joint ownership of property and the concomitant 
right of survivorship; hospital visitation and other rights incident to the medical 
treatment of a family member; and the right to receive, and the obligation to 
provide spousal support, maintenance, and property division in the event of 
separation or divorce…37
Other benefits could be added to this list.  Suffice it to say that the economic benefits of 
marriage are many.  None of these benefits are available to same-sex couples unless the 
law is changed to include these couples within the ambit of the law’s protection.  
Vermont’s Civil Union Law provides the broadest kind of protection to the same- sex 
couple, giving the couple the full economic protection of marriage through the Civil 
Union Law.    
Although many of the benefits of marriage gained by the partners in the Vermont 
decision are economic, non-economic benefits also become available including the 
spousal evidentiary privilege and hospital visitation privileges.38  Rights related to the 
37
 Baker v State, 170 Vt. 194, 220, 744 A.2d 864, 883-884  (Vt. 1999).
38
 Vermont Statutes Ann., Title 15, Ch. 23, § 1204  (e) includes a list of all the benefits accorded to a same-
sex partner.  Section (e) states:  The following is a nonexclusive list of legal benefits, protections and 
responsibilities of spouses, which shall apply in like manner to parties to a civil union…(4) adoption law 
and procedure…(6) spouse abuse programs under 3 VSA § 18…(12) family leave benefits…(15) law 
relating to immunity from compelled testimony and the marital communication privilege…(18) the 
definition of family farmer under 10 VSA § 272…(19) laws relating to the making, revoking and objecting 
to anatomical gifts by others under 18 VSA § 5240…(21) application for early voter absentee ballot under 
couple’s children also may be affected by the new law.39  Entering into a civil union in 
Vermont also affects the ability of a partner to enter into other civil unions or marriages; 
the law restricts the ability of a partner to have more than one partnership or marriage 
relationship at the same time.40
In Vermont same-sex couples are entitled to the entire bundle of rights and 
responsibilities included in a package equivalent to marriage. Perhaps same-sex couples 
are content with laws that make the bundle of rights and responsibilities available to them 
without giving them the status of marriage.  In fact, for some, acquiring the rights in a 
structure outside of marriage is preferable.41
What is missing in the Vermont civil union law is recognition of same- sex couples as 
being married.  Their status, although equivalent to marriage in terms of economic rights 
and other marital rights, is not the same as marriage.  It is called something different and 
does not have the same status as marriage.  The incremental impact of the lists of rights 
17 VSA § 2532…(22) family landowner rights to fish and hunt under 10 VSA § 4253…(24) affirmance of 
relationship under 15 VSA § 7. 
39 See Footnote 19, supra, 2022.  The author points out that American courts have moved to protect the 
same-sex partners in the context of disputes regarding the custody of children and other issues about 
children.  See Vt. St. Ann., tit. 15, ch. 23, § 1204 that provides a list of the benefits, protections and 
responsibilities of parties to a civil union including; (d) the law of domestic relations, including annulment, 
separation and divorce, child custody and support, and property division and maintenance shall apply to 
parties to a civil union; (f) the rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of whom either 
becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil union, shall be the same as those of a married 
couple, with respect to a child of whom either spouse becomes the natural parent during the marriage.
40
 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, ch. 23, § 1202 provides:  Requisites of a valid civil union:  For a civil union to be 
established in Vermont, it shall be necessary that the parties to a civil union satisfy all of the following 
criteria:  (1) Not be a party to another civil union or a marriage….  
41
 In a presentation at the International Society of Family Law North American Regional Conference, in 
June 2003 at the University of Oregon School of Law, Professor Nancy Polikoff discussed her thesis 
criticizing the emphasis on obtaining same-sex marriage and proposing that instead of the legal status of 
marriage, focus should be on a legal regime that values caregiving and emotional and economic 
interdependence.  See also Harry D. Krause, Marriage For The New Millennium:  Heterosexual, Same 
Sex—or Not at All?,  34 FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY 271, 276 (2000).  In this essay, Professor Krause 
questions the function of marriage in today’s society.  He says, “The conclusion is obvious:  Today’s sexual 
and associational lifestyles differ so much that the state should not continue to deal with them as though 
they were one:  the old role-divided, procreative marriage of history.  That marriage may not yet be history, 
but it should be seen for what it has become:  one lifestyle choice among many.”
bestowed on the partners does not bestow on them the status of marriage.   For instance, 
in Rosengarten v. Downes, the court made it clear that the family court had no subject 
matter jurisdiction to dissolve a same-sex union precisely because the court did not 
regard the union as a marriage.42
While the court said that the policy in Connecticut does not favor recognition of 
same-sex marriage or same-sex unions, it pointed to other legislation that allows same-
sex couple adoptions along with other rights.43  This is consistent with the law in most 
states in the United States as well as in European countries, which have recognized some 
rights for same-sex couples equivalent to the rights of heterosexual couples.  These rights 
have been acquired through incremental changes in the law and do not provide equivalent 
status or equivalent rights to marriage.  The exceptions are the changes that have 
occurred in such places as Canada and Vermont.  But even Vermont has not provided its 
same-sex couples with marriage.
On the other hand, the decision recently handed down in Massachusetts may offer 
greater protection to same-sex couples.  The court, in holding that the marriage statute 
violates state constitutional rights of same-sex couples who wish to marry, states:  “(W)e 
construe civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the 
exclusion of all others.  This reformulation redresses the plaintiffs’ constitutional injury 
and furthers the aim of marriage to promote stable, exclusive relationships.”44
42
 Rosengarten v. Downes, 71 Conn App 372, 378, 802 A2d 170, 175 ( ).  The court states that the 
issue regarding jurisdiction of a civil union did not raise issues of marriage because “this civil union is not a 
marriage” as defined in Connecticut or in Vermont.  On the basis of that, the court found that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the dissolution of the relationship.
43 Id.
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In reaching this holding, the court considered the goals that the state presented in 
three legislative rationales for prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying: 1) providing 
a good setting for procreation; 2) ensuring a good setting for child rearing; 3) preserving 
scarce State and private financial resources.  And the court rejects in turn all of these 
justifications for drawing the distinction between same-sex partnerships and heterosexual 
partnerships.45  In the end, the Court may be paving the way for same-sex partnerships to 
marry in the same way that heterosexual couples marry.  The court gives the Legislature 
180 days to “take such action as it may deem appropriate in light of this opinion.” If the 
Legislature does not, then the impact of this decision takes effect to hold that same-sex 
partners have rights to be recognized under the state marriage laws.  The Vermont 
decision did not go quite so far, although it left open the possibility of having the 
petitioners come back to court if the Legislature was unable to remedy the problem that 
made the marriage laws constitutionally defective.  Although it is possible that the 
Legislature in Massachusetts will create the same remedy as the Vermont Legislature 
created, it is possible that the marriage statute will be amended to include same-sex 
couples as qualified for marriage.  
In many respects, the difference in the two approaches may seem more academic than 
practical.  However, part of the reason for seeking to marry includes not only the legal 
rights of marriage, but also the recognition of those rights in the form of the status of 
marriage.  The Massachusetts remedy has the potential for providing a broader protection 
for same-sex unions than the Vermont decision did, although the Legislature in 
Massachusetts may fashion a remedy that is similar to the Civil Union Law enacted in 
Vermont.
45
 Decision 9-12.
Part II:  Interstate Conflict-of-Law Issues
Given the different positions the states have taken on recognition of same-sex unions, 
conflict-of-law issues between the states will inevitably arise.  Given the economic and 
other issues at stake, it is apparent why the issues are so important to same-sex couples.
Given that Canada and two countries in Europe have legalized same-sex marriage, 
and given that Massachusetts has declared that its marriage law violates the constitutional 
rights of same-sex couples, it is likely that at some point, a state court will be called upon 
to recognize the marriage union of a same-sex couple.  Conflicts between states’ marriage 
laws and between state and foreign countries’ marriage laws are undoubtedly going to 
arise.  
Since Vermont adopted the Civil Union Law, sister courts have already been called 
upon to accept the status of a partner joined by a civil union in Vermont.  
The following highlights some of the issues courts will have to consider in deciding 
the cases:
Conflicts in laws may arise when a couple who lives in a state that does not recognize 
same-sex unions goes to a state that does to marry or to create a civil union or obtain 
other protection offered by that state.  For instance, a couple domiciled in New York may 
travel to Vermont to register their relationship as a civil union.  They may then return to 
New York and at some point ask a New York court to recognize the legality of their 
relationship created pursuant to Vermont law.  Or the couple may be domiciled in the 
state that offers the protection but may leave that state and move to another state that does 
not recognize same-sex unions or does not recognize the protection available in the state 
where the couple had lived.  A couple domiciled in Vermont and registered in Vermont 
as a civil union under the Civil Union Law may move to Arizona and live in Arizona for 
a number of years.  At some point while they are domiciled in Arizona, they may ask a 
court in Arizona to recognize their union.
The conflict may arise in different factual circumstances.  For instance, a couple that 
entered into a Civil Union may desire to divorce in a different jurisdiction.  The couple 
may ask the court to take jurisdiction of the matter as it would a divorce of a heterosexual 
couple.  Or, a partner may ask a court to provide the protection at a partner’s death.  For 
instance, if a couple had entered into a Civil Union pursuant to the option provided in 
Vermont law, and one of the partners had died, the other member of the couple might 
want to pursue a wrongful death action or some other kind of tort action.
A. Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act
The issue of recognition of a same-sex marriage in a sister state brings the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act into play.  The Full Faith and 
Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act provide guidance to the states on how a 
sister state is to treat another state’s law or judgment.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause 
provides:  “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records 
and Judicial Proceedings of every other State.”46  The Clause has been interpreted to 
require that sister states give recognition to judgments entered in other states.  If, for 
example, a state court in a state that has legalized same-sex marriage has entered a 
judgment to dissolve the marriage, according to the Clause, a sister state’s court is 
obligated to enforce the judgment in its court.  On the other hand, the sister court may not 
46 See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
be obligated to recognize the law of the state that legalized same-sex marriage if a party 
initiates the divorce proceeding in her court.  In that divorce proceeding, the court might 
apply its own law.47
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) adds another layer of federal law to be 
considered.  When Congress enacted DOMA, it interpreted the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause to mean that states are not obligated to give effect to acts or records of judicial 
proceedings of another state that treat relationships between persons of the same sex as 
marriage.48  DOMA is a specific provision that excuses states from giving full faith and 
credit to sister state laws and judgments that treat same-sex relationships as equivalent to 
marriage.      
Under DOMA, a state court could refuse to enforce either the law or the judgment of 
the sister court.49  To the extent that DOMA is construed in a way that gives state courts 
the option of not enforcing sister-state money judgments, the law is an exception to the 
generally held principles of Full Faith and Credit that the sister-state courts have 
traditionally followed and may be unconstitutional.50  To the extent that the DOMA 
47
 Borchers, Patrick, Baker v. General Motors:  Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non-
Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L.REV. 147, 164 (1998).  The author states:  As things stand now, 
therefore, there is a wide divergence in the way in which the Court applies the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
to judgments and to laws.  Judgments—assuming that they meet the Court’s exacting definition—are 
essentially unassailable if presented to another court, unless entered without personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Sister-state laws, however, are by no means entitled to automatic application.  Rather, courts 
are permitted to apply their own law and refuse the application of a sister-state’s law in almost all cases.  
Under the Hague-Wortman line of cases, a state court is prohibited from applying its own law only if that 
state has no significant contacts with the parties or the transaction and the application of forum law cannot 
be justified under traditional choice-of-law principles.
48
 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub.L.No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 
1999) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV 1998) that provides:  No State, territory, or possession of the 
United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial 
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of 
the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, 
or a right or claim arising from such relationship.  See also, Silverman, Lewis, Vermont Civil Unions, Full 
Faith and Credit, and Marital Status, 89 KENTUCKY L.J. 1075 (2000-2001). 
49 See Borchers, supra, note 24 at 180-182.
50
 Borchers, supra note 24, at 182-183.
instructs a sister court that it is not obligated to follow the law of another state, DOMA is 
not a departure from generally held views about recognition of state law by a sister state.  
These issues have been covered in great detail in many other articles and will not be 
considered at great length.51  Discussion in recent case law and academic writing raises 
questions about the constitutionality of DOMA.52
B.   State Statutes Prohibiting Recognition of Same-sex Unions
Many states have enacted state laws that prohibit recognition of same-sex unions 
whether contracted in the state or outside.  Some states have accomplished this by 
clarifying the concept of marriage, making it clear that marriage is a union of a male and 
a female.53  Other states have enacted statutes stating that same-sex marriages recognized 
by another state or another country will not be recognized in that state.54  Still other states 
have enacted statutes that include express prohibition of same-sex marriages, making it 
clear that the public policy of the state is to retain the heterosexual model of marriage as 
51
 For further discussion of the constitutionality of DOMA, see Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict 
of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1970 (1997); Strasser, 
Mark, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: on DOMA, Covenant Marriages, and Full Faith and Credit 
Jurisprudence, 64 BROOKLYN L. REV. 307 (1998).
52
 Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital of N.Y., 2003 WL 21294889 (N.Y Sup.)  The court says:  “It is unclear 
by what authority the Congress may suspend or limit the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, and 
the constitutionality of DOMA has been put in doubt  (see, e.g. Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for 
Disaster:  on DOMA, Covenant Marriages, and Full Faith and Credit Jurisprudence, 64 BROOKLYN 
L.REV. 307).”  Decision, p. 4.
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 Cal. Fam. Code § 300 provides:  “Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a 
man and a woman, to which the consent of the parties capable of making that contract is necessary.  
Consent alone does not constitute marriage.”  Other statutes provide the same kind of specific language that 
restricts marriage to a male and a female.  See Michael T. Morley et al, Developments in Law and Policy:  
Emerging Issues in Family Law, 21 YALE LAW & POL. REV. 169, 188 (2003)
54 Id. at 189.  The author points out several states that have adopted this approach including Alaska, Idaho, 
Kentucky, Michigan and North Carolina.
the only one acceptable.55  And some states have created a hybrid statute that combines 
the policies of the above statutes.56
To the extent that these statutes define the concept of marriage in the state, it seems 
clear that the state legislature has the authority to define the concept of marriage within 
the state.57  Of course, one might make the argument that the restriction in a marriage 
statute violates federal constitutional law; if it does, the law will be struck down.58  But 
otherwise, a state has authority to regulate marriage as it sees fit.
To the extent that these statutes attempt to regulate marriages entered into out of the 
state, the statutes are like mini-DOMA laws that express a state policy against recognition 
of out-of-state marriages between same-sex partners.59  The statutes may be interpreted to 
mean that citizens domiciled in the state who marry outside the state will not have same-
sex marriages recognized in the state.  Or the statute may mean that no out-of-state 
marriages, whether entered into by state domiciliaries or others will be recognized in-
state.  To the extent that the statute makes it clear that the enforcement of an out-of-state 
judgment is not appropriate, a state should not enforce the other state’s judgment 
regarding a same-sex marriage.  
The Alaska statute provides that, “A marriage entered into by persons of the same 
sex, either under common law or under statute, that is recognized by another state or 
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
58 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
59 See Elaine M. DeFranco, Choice of Law:  Will a Wisconsin Court Recognize a Vermont Civil Union?,  85 
MARQUETTE L. REV. 251 (2001).  The author states that “Since 1995, with the advent of the Defense of 
Marriage Act as well as the developments in Hawaii and Alaska, the majority of states have revised their 
marriage statutes to either explicitly prohibit same-sex marriage or specifically define marriage as the union 
between a man and woman, or male and female.” P. 259.  See also David Orgon Coolidge, William C. 
Duncan, Definition or Discrimination?  State Marriage Recognition Statutes in the Same-Sex Marriage 
Debate, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 3 (1998); 
foreign jurisdiction is void in this state, and contractual rights granted by virtue of the 
marriage, including its termination, are unenforceable in this state.”60  The terms of the 
statute indicate that the state does not sanction same-sex marriages, either in-state or out-
of-state.  The statute applies to those who are domiciled in the state who go outside the 
state to marry and also appears to apply to those who may seek recognition of an out-of-
state union in Alaska.  The language states that the contract rights are unenforceable in 
the state.  To the extent that one regards the terms of the money judgment for support as a 
contract right emanating from the marriage, the statute suggests that enforcement of a 
judgment based on contract rights would also be unenforceable in Alaska.  Whether or 
not a statute that limits the rights of parties who legally married in a different jurisdiction 
from recognition of those rights in the home jurisdiction may involve constitutional 
questions.61  A statute that restricts the enforceability of an out-of-state judgment in its 
state courts does involve issues of constitutional proportion.62
Whether a civil union is included in the prohibition of a state statute that prohibits 
same-sex marriage depends upon the specific language of the statute and how a court 
construes the statute.  For instance, the Alaska statute that states that, “A marriage 
entered into by persons of the same sex, …that is recognized by another state or foreign 
jurisdiction is void in this state….”  The statute goes on to state, “A same-sex relationship 
60
 Alaska Stat. § 25.05.013 (Michie 2002).
61
 Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster:  On DOMA, Covenant Marriages, and Full Faith 
and Credit Jurisprudence, 64 BROOKLYN LAW REV. 307 (1998).  The author states:  “The Court has 
explained that there are minimal constitutional limits on which state’s laws are applicable to a particular 
occurrence or transaction.  For example, ‘if a State has only an insignificant contact with the parties and the 
occurrence or transaction, application of its law is unconstitutional.’  However, the Court has failed to make 
sufficiently clear how minimal those contacts must be, having recognized that ‘it is frequently the case 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause that a court can lawfully apply either the law of one State or the 
contrary law of another.’  Some commentators have concluded that, as a general matter, the forum state can 
apply its own law without much fear of being overturned on constitutional grounds.”  Pp. 328-329. 
62 Id. at 318-319.
may not be recognized by the state as being entitled to the benefits of marriage.”63  The 
language makes if fairly obvious that the prohibition relates to relationships other than 
marriage.  California’s new Domestic Partner Act does not purport to create marriage 
rights for same-sex partners, but does give same-sex partners many of the same rights 
that married partners enjoy in California.  The Act further provides that domestic 
partnerships formed in other states will be recognized as valid in California.64  This 
approach is the opposite of the states that make it clear that out-of-state unions will not be 
recognized.
The statutes enacted by the states raise constitutional issues about the authority that a 
state has to determine the effect of an out-of-state law or an out-of-state judgment.  But 
most importantly, the statutes also raise conflict-of-law issues between the applicable law 
of a sister state that allowed parties to enter into a same-sex union, while the law of 
another sister state prohibits recognition of that very same union. 
C.  Conflict-of-Law Issues
Conflict-of-law issues arise when same-sex partners have married or created a union 
in a jurisdiction that recognizes the relationship and then move or return to a jurisdiction 
that does not recognize such a union.  A state court may be called upon to recognize or 
validate the relationship not authorized by the law in that state.  
To resolve the conflict, one must first determine the basis for it.  If local law allows 
marriage and the other state does not, the conflict may be regarded as one between 
63 See Alaska Stat. § 25.05.013 (Michie 2002).
64
 Section 299.2 of the Act provides:  A legal union of two persons of the same sex, other than a marriage, 
that was validly formed in another jurisdiction, and that is substantially equivalent to a domestic 
partnership as defined in this part, shall be recognized as a valid domestic partnership in this state 
regardless of whether it bears the name domestic partnership.
marriage statutes.  Generally, marriages valid where performed are recognized in other 
states.65  The Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws provides that “A marriage 
which satisfies the requirements of the State where the marriage was contracted will 
everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another 
State which has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the 
time of the marriage.”66  In determining which state has the most significant relationship, 
Section 6 of the Restatement provides that the courts should follow any statutory 
directives on the issue, “the needs of the interstate and international systems, the relevant 
policies of the forum, the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative 
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, the protection of the 
parties’ justified expectations, certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and ease 
in the determination and application of the law to be applied.”67
65
 Scoles and Hay, CONFLICTS OF LAW, § 13.5 at 548 provides:  “The usual statement of the traditional 
doctrine in the United States on the validity of a marriage is that a marriage is valid everywhere if valid 
under the law of the state where the marriage takes place, except in rare instances.  The most prominent 
exceptions are those marriages involving polygamy and incest, i.e., the enjoyment of the incidents that are 
positively prohibited by the local law.”
66
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 283 (1971).  The reporter for the Second 
Restatement states:  
This formulation reflects the three underlying values of (a) State interest, (b) protection of the 
expectations of the parties and (c) the general policy favouring the validation of marriages.  Subsection 
(2) calls, as a general rule, for the application of the law of the State of celebration provided that the 
marriage would be valid under that law.
The formulation further makes clear that a marriage good under the law of the State of celebration 
should not be overthrown unless this is required by the ‘strong public policy’ of the State of most 
significant relationship.
…In making this determination, the forum should first inquire whether the courts of the State of 
most significant relationship would have invalidated the marriage if the question had come before 
them.  The fact that these courts would not have done so provides, of course, conclusive evidence that 
no strong policy of this State is involved.  If, on the other hand, these courts would have invalidated the 
marriage…the forum would have good reason to do likewise.  It would in all probability invalidate the 
marriage…if the parties were still domiciled in the State which was that of most significant 
relationship at the time of the marriage.  The situation would be somewhat different, however, if by the 
time the action arose the parties had moved to a different State…(A) state will naturally have less 
interest in having its invalidating rule applied in a case where the parties to the marriage have moved 
away than it would if they have remained its local domiciliaries. 
67
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, section 6 (1971).  UNIFORM MARRIAGE 
AND DIVORCE ACT section 210, 9 U.L.A. 176 (1987) provides an even more liberal approach to 
If parties were married in a state that is also their domicile, it is very unlikely that a 
court in another state will invalidate their marriage as the domiciliary state appropriately 
applied its own law to the marriage   All relevant policies point to recognition because no 
other state has an interest in the validity of the marriage similar to the interest of the state 
where parties are domiciled.  Invalidating the marriage would happen only in rare cases 
where the state has a very strong public policy against recognition.  
More difficult conflict questions arise when the parties domiciled in a state that 
prohibits the marriage travel to a state that allows the marriage, marry, and return to their 
home state shortly after marrying.   In Re May’s Estate68 considers the public policy 
interests at stake when domiciliaries of the state travel to another state to marry in 
violation of the local state’s marriage law.  An uncle and niece married in Rhode Island 
where their marriage was legal.  They returned to New York and lived for 32 years before 
the wife died, at which time their children questioned the validity of the marriage in a 
probate proceeding.  New York did not allow a marriage between an uncle and a niece.  
The court concluded that “such marriage, solemnized, as it was, in accord with the ritual 
of the Jewish faith in a State whose legislative body has declared such a marriage to be 
‘good and valid in law,’ was not offensive to the public sense of morality to a degree 
regarded generally with abhorrence and thus was not within the inhibitions of natural 
law.”69
recognition of marriages contracted out of the forum state.  Section 210 provides:  “All Marriages 
contracted within this state prior to January 1, 1975, or outside this state that were valid at the time of the 
contract or subsequently validated by the laws of the place in which they were contracted or by the 
domicile of the parties are valid in this state.”  On the other hand the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act limits 
recognition of marriages contracted in another state when the parties left the state to avoid the marriage 
laws of the domicile state.  See, for example, VT.STAT.ANN tit.15, § 5 (1993). 
68
 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953).
69
 Decision, 
Many courts faced with similar issues regarding recognition of an out-of-state 
marriage of a couple domiciled in the state have followed the reasoning of the court in In 
Re May’s Estate when dealing with incest restrictions, age restrictions and restrictions on 
remarriage following divorce.70
The reasons for a court’s willingness to validate a marriage that is in conflict with its 
local law are illustrated in In Re May’s Estate.  The parties were not questioning the 
validity of their marriage.  One of the parties died, and the children were seeking to have 
the marriage declared void so that a daughter could be named as her mother’s 
representative.  If the court voids the marriage, it will not give effect to the intention of 
the two parties to remain married.  After the death of one of the parties, whether or not 
the marriage violated local law becomes less important because the parties lived together 
for 32 years and had four children.  Given the policies mentioned by the Restatement, the 
court chose protection of the parties’ justified expectations as an important value in 
making its decision.  The court also is mindful of the fact that state policy in New York is 
less threatened by validating this marriage than Rhode Island law would be if the court 
did not validate the marriage.  Predictability and reliability of legal out-of-state marriages 
is an important value.  
If the court had been called upon to recognize the status of the parties as married 
while they are married, perhaps it would have had more significant policy reasons for 
invalidating the union.  In that case, its court is being called upon to validate the status of
a relationship that the local law considers unlawful.  But after one of the parties is 
deceased, it seems less harmful to local state policies to recognize the union that the state 
considers unlawful. 
70 See Hays and Scoles, supra footnote 42, at 555-565. 
Another way to view the legal conflicts issue created in a same-sex union case is as a 
contract dispute.  The Legislature in Vermont, in its Civil Union law, created a contract-
form different from marriage.  The arrangement could be viewed as more a contract than 
a marriage.  If a dispute arises concerning a contract, the Restatement has a different rule 
for determining applicable law.  Where the parties have not provided for the choice of 
law, the Restatement Second of Conflicts states that the “rights and duties of the parties 
with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state which, 
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the 
parties under the principles stated in section 6.”71 (Section 6 refers to the general 
principles and policies that should be taken into account in resolving conflicts.)  If the 
parties have provided for their resolution of this issue, that state law will govern their 
contract rights.72
Parties entering into a civil union in Vermont obviously expect that the law of 
Vermont will govern their relationship.  If they live in Vermont, it is obvious that the 
nexus of the relationship is in Vermont and no other state has as great an interest in the 
71
 RESTATEMENT SECOND OF CONFLICTS, § 188.  The section also provides:  2) In the absence of an 
effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the contacts to be taken into account in applying the 
principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
a) The place of contracting,
b) The place of negotiation of the contract,
c) The place of performance,
d) The location of the subject matter of the contract, and
e) The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the 
parties.  
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
3) If the pace of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the same state, the local law of 
this state will usually be applied, except as otherwise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.
72 Id. at § 187.  The section contains a caveat that (2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern 
their contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could 
not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either (a) the 
chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable 
basis for the parties’ choice, or (b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a 
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the 
determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable 
law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.  
contract and its terms.  If parties from a different state travel to Vermont to enter into a 
civil union, but then return to their home state, another state in addition to Vermont has 
an interest in the contract.  If the parties have not expressly designated Vermont law to 
control their contract, it may be that the law of the other state will control because the 
parties are domiciled in that other state.  That other state, by virtue of being the domicile 
of the parties, has a significant relationship to the contract.  One might expect that the 
issues about recognition of the contract will be resolved similarly to the way the marriage 
cases are resolved.  The longer the contract has been in effect, and depending on the 
circumstances for the dispute, the more likely it is that a court would validate the contract 
entered into by the parties.  
Although Vermont and now Massachusetts are the only states that sanction same-sex 
unions as equivalent to marriage, some states recognize and enforce cohabitation 
contracts between unmarried partners.73 If one of the partners raised the validity of the 
contract in another state, a conflicts issue is raised that would be solved by focusing on 
the conflict in contracts law rather than marriage law.  The focus of this article is on the 
conflict issues in marriage law and does not deal with the contract conflicts issue.  It is no 
doubt important to keep in mind that a contract approach may be preferable in some cases 
even though a contract analysis may not provide a party the benefits of marriage.  
The following are several different hypothetical problems that create conflict-of-law 
issues.  How these conflicts would be resolved is discussed.
73 See Carol S. Bruch, Cohabitation in the Common Law Countries a Decade After Marvin:  Settled In or 
Moving Ahead?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717 (1989).  The article discusses the recognition gay couples 
have received as unmarried cohabitants.
1.  Conflict regarding dissolution of same-sex union
PROBLEM:  
John and Joseph are residents of New York.  When Vermont passed its Civil Union 
Law, they immediately traveled to Vermont and registered as a civil union in 
Vermont.  They have lived together for several years and now are separated.  John 
has met someone new and would like to end the civil union.  He would like to file for 
dissolution in New York.  Since neither of the parties to the union currently resides in 
Vermont, it makes more sense to dissolve the union in New York.  What will a New 
York court do in this case?  Will it take jurisdiction and dissolve the relationship?
Rosengarten v. Downes74 is a case very similar to the fact pattern presented above.   
Plaintiff and defendant were joined in a civil union in Vermont.  Plaintiff sought to have 
the civil union dissolved as it had broken down irretrievably.  Plaintiff had established 
residency in Connecticut before filing the dissolution complaint.  The court holds that it 
is without jurisdiction to consider the dissolution because the court may only consider 
“family relations matters,” and a civil union is not a family relations matter as set forth in 
the statutes.75
In deciding that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, the court found that 
the state public policy is against recognition of same-sex unions.  In making this 
determination, the court relied on the history of recent legislation allowing same-sex 
partners to adopt and legislative history concerning the state’s decision not to adopt the 
74
 Rosengarten v. Downes, 71 Conn.App.372, 802 A.2d 170 (2002).  An appeal of this case to the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut was filed and the petition for certification for appeal was granted.  261 Conn. 936, 
806 A.2d 1066.  It was dismissed on December 21, 2002 as moot.  
75 Id. at 71 Conn.App. 379, 802 A.2d 175.
Defense of Marriage Act.76  The court uses the legislative history to show that the public 
policy of Connecticut is not to recognize same-sex unions, but to follow a path different 
from the one followed in Vermont.  The court decided that a civil union is not a family 
relations matter and therefore not within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court 
because the public policy of Connecticut is not supportive of recognition of same-sex 
unions.   
Another recent case from Georgia failed to give recognition to a same-sex union in 
the context of a custody dispute.   In Burns v. Burns77 the question before the court 
concerned interpretation of a consent decree between two divorcing parties that restricted 
visitation of children when the party being visited cohabited with any adult to whom the 
party was not legally married.78  Mother Susan subsequently went to Vermont and 
entered into a civil union with a female companion.  When her former husband 
complained that she violated the consent decree by cohabiting with her partner during 
visitation with her children, she countered that the parties had been joined together in a 
legally recognized union in Vermont and that she had not violated the terms of the 
76
 In enacting the adoption law contained in General Statutes § 45a-727a the court said:  “It becomes clear 
from a careful reading of the floor debate on this legislation in both houses, that a number of legislators 
were opposed to adoption of this legislation if it were to be used later in any way as a wedge by appellate or 
trial courts to require recognition of civil unions in Connecticut in the manner they ascribed to the Vermont 
Supreme Court in Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 744 A.2d 864 (1999).”  Members of the General Assembly 
in their floor debate in each house did not make explicit mention of Baker.  It is clear, however, that several 
legislators were concerned, as a result of the Vermont experience, that in overriding the ruling in the In re 
Baby Z case by permitting adoption of a child who already had a natural or adoptive parent by another 
person of the same sex who was not lawfully married to that parent, they did not allow an appellate court to 
use that legislative enactment as a wedge to bring down the laws of Connecticut concerning who may 
marry.  See, e.g., 43 S. Proc., supra, p. 2451-52.  In addition, the court mentions that, “contrary to the 
plaintiff’s assertions, the legislative history reveals that the legislature failed to enact its own version of the 
Defense of Marriage Act not because it intended to evince a willingness to recognize civil unions but 
because it thought such an enactment unnecessary.”  
77
 253 Ga.App 600, 560 S.E.2d 47 (2002).
78 Id. at 253 Ga.App. 600.  The consent order stated:  “[t]here shall be no visitation nor residence by the 
children with either party during any time where such party cohabits with or has overnight stays with any 
adult to which such party is not legally married or to whom party is not related within the second degree.”
decree.  The court agreed with her husband because Georgia law defines marriage as a 
relationship between a man and a woman and prohibits the recognition of same-sex 
unions recognized in other states.79
Since the statutes make it clear that Georgia has public policy that opposes same-sex 
marriage or recognition of the unions, the result is not at all surprising.
Another recent case recognizes the same-sex union entered into in Vermont by two 
New York domiciliaries.  In Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital of New York,80 the parties 
had entered into a Vermont civil union when shortly afterwards one of the partners, Neal 
Spicehandler, was struck by a car and later died at the hospital.  His partner, John Langan 
sued for wrongful death.  To qualify as a person who may sue under the wrongful death 
statute, the person must qualify as a surviving spouse.81
Before the court defined the term spouse, it examined the conflicts rule for 
recognition of out-of-state unions.  New York recognizes out-of-state marriages if valid 
where they are made unless the marriage is against the strong public policy of the state.  
The court noted that common law marriages and other marriages that may not be created 
in New York have been upheld in New York.82  The court goes on to look at its public 
79
 OCGA § 19-3.3.1(b) provides: “[n]o marriage between persons of the same sex shall be recognized as 
entitled to the benefits of marriage.  Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex pursuant to a 
marriage license issued by another state or foreign jurisdiction or otherwise shall be void in this state.  Any 
contractual rights granted by virtue of such license shall be unenforceable in the courts of this state and the 
courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction whatsoever under any circumstances to grant a divorce or 
separate maintenance with respect to such marriage or otherwise to consider or rule on any of the parties’ 
respective rights arising as a result of or in connection with such marriage.  Moreover, Georgia is not 
required to give full faith and credit to same-sex marriages of other states.”
80
 2003 WL 21294889 (N.Y.Sup.) (2003).
81
 The wrongful death statute defines classes of people who may recover for wrongful death including 
distributees who include a “spouse, issue, parents, grandparents or their issue.”  Id. at 8.  
82 See, for instance, Matter of Mays Estate, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 ( ); Ferraro v. Ferraro, 192 
Misc. 484, 77 N.Y.S.2d 246, aff’d sub nom. Fernandes v. Fernandes, 275 App.Div. 777, 87 N.Y.S.2d 707.
policy and determines that its public policy “does not preclude recognition of a same-sex 
union entered into in a sister state.”83 The court says:  
Under principles of full faith and credit and comity, and following authority which 
advances the concept that citizens ought to be able to move from one state to another 
without concern for the validity or recognition of their marital status, New York will 
recognize a marriage sanctioned and contracted in a sister state and there appears to 
be no valid legal basis to distinguish one between a same-sex couple.  And, unlike a 
non ceremonial common law marriage contracted in a sister state which may be 
dissolved at will, yet is recognized in New York, the Vermont civil union requires a 
sanctioned civil ceremony, a license, and, significantly, a divorce to end the union.84
Once the court agrees that recognition of the relationship is compatible with the public 
policy of New York, the court makes the logical move to construe spouse in the wrongful 
death statute to include a same-sex marital partner.  It recognizes that the term 
undoubtedly did not mean same-sex partner when it was written, but the concept of 
spouse has evolved over time and now does include same-sex partner.
Where the state has a statute that expressly declares same-sex marriage prohibited and 
void in the state, it is difficult to argue that a same-sex union is compatible with state 
public policy.  On the other hand, where the jurisdiction has not enacted such a statute, 
public policy may be more difficult to determine.  In Connecticut, the court relied on 
legislative history to point to policy that is not supportive of same-sex unions while New 
York pointed to cases and other statutes that supported same-sex unions in its 
jurisdiction.   
When John and Joseph entered into a civil union in Vermont, they entered into a 
union equivalent to marriage in all respects.  Section 1206 of the Civil Union law 
provides that, “The dissolution of civil unions shall follow the same procedures and be 
83
 2003 WL 21294889, 5 (N.Y. Sup.).
84 Id. at 7.
subject to the same substantive rights and obligations that are involved in the dissolution 
of marriage….”85
In order for John to end the union, he is required to file for dissolution according to 
the Vermont law.  When John files for dissolution in a family court in New York to 
dissolve his civil union, the first question faced by the court is whether it will recognize 
the civil union.  If the court is unwilling to recognize the union, it will certainly not 
consider dissolving it.
A New York court is likely not obligated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to 
enforce the Vermont civil union law in New York.  Restatement Second of Conflicts 
states that if a marriage satisfies the requirements of the state where it was contracted, it 
should be recognized as valid in other states unless it violates the strong public policy of 
that other state which had the “most significant relationship to the spouses and the 
marriage” when the parties married.86  Because both parties resided in New York when 
they entered into the civil union and because John is asking a New York court to dissolve 
the union, New York is the state that had the most significant relationship to the spouses 
at the time of their marriage and also the most significant relationship to the spouses at 
the time of their divorce.  
Although it is not entirely clear that New York would use the Restatement Second 
rationale for resolution of this conflicts issue, this analysis follows that approach.  
To determine whether New York should invalidate the marriage, it must first look to 
whether or not any state statutes would invalidate this out-of-state marriage of local 
domiciliaries.  New York has not enacted legislation as many states have that explicitly 
85
 Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 15, ch. 23, § 1206. 
86
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 283 (2).  
states that same-sex marriage will not be recognized within the state.  If it had, the answer 
would be clear that the statute states the policy and makes it clear that the marriage would 
not be recognized. 
 New York’s conflicts law is consistent with recognition of out-of-state unions so 
long as the marriage does not violate a strong public policy of the state.87 The conflicts 
rule does not preclude recognition of this out-of-state union.
New York will then have to determine whether there is a sufficiently strong public 
policy at stake to warrant invalidation of the rule.  New York clearly does not have an 
established state policy or state law that makes a same-sex union illegal.  To the contrary, 
recent cases and established law in New York suggest that the established policy may be 
receptive to same-sex relationships.88  In a recent New York case the court concluded that 
New York is receptive to same-sex relationships and pointed to laws providing same-sex 
couples employment benefits, rent control protection, adoption rights, and most recently 
protection for same-sex partners aggrieved by the tragic loss of life on September 11, 
2001 in New York City.89  Given what this court had to say about the public policy of the 
law in New York, it is very possible that a New York court would accept the validity of 
the civil union and would consider the issues presented by a partner seeking dissolution 
of the union.90
87
 See Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital of N.Y., 2003 WL 21294889 (N.Y.Sup.) that states New York’s 
conflict rule that “New York adheres to the general rule that ‘marriage contracts, valid where made, are 
valid everywhere, unless contrary to natural laws or statutes.’”  Citations omitted. P. 3.
88 See Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital of N.Y., 2003 WL 21294889 (N.Y.Sup.) that outlines the New 
York position on this issue:  “The presumption of legitimacy, when extended to a same-sex couple, 
together with the obligations of support and requirement for a divorce, indicate that the civil union is 
indistinguishable from marriage, notwithstanding that the Vermont legislature withheld the title of marriage 
from application to the union.”  Decision, p.7.
89
 See Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital of N.Y., id, at 4-5.
90
 Most other jurisdictions would probably not agree with New York’s analysis of this.  For states that have 
enacted a mini-DOMA, the state law makes it clear that a state court should not recognize the Vermont law 
If the court accepts the validity of a civil union, it agrees to accept the validity of a 
civil union contracted in Vermont.  It follows that it also accepts the status of the parties 
as a couple bound by the laws of Vermont in a civil union.   Although the court may 
accept the validity of the civil union, it does not follow that the court will agree to accept 
jurisdiction of its dissolution.
Whether the fact that the court is considering the dissolution of a civil union would 
change the court’s view of application of local law is an issue to be considered.  When 
the parties entered into their civil union, they registered with the state and participated in 
a proceeding not unlike a marriage ceremony.91  They intended to enter into a partnership 
that provided them with the rights and responsibilities of marriage.92  They intended to 
enter into a contract with one another and the state of Vermont that provided they would 
need to divorce if they wished to end their relationship.93
Given that the parties entered into an agreement that they expected would be regarded 
as a marriage and would require the same kind of dissolution process as a marriage, the 
court in New York could apply its own dissolution law without frustrating the intent of 
the parties.  On the other hand, a court in New York might decide that the dissolution of a 
civil union should be handled in Vermont since Vermont has enacted legislation to 
and give effect to a civil union and thereby consider the dissolution of the union.  Connecticut apparently 
shares this view given the decision in Rosengarten v. Downes, 71 Conn.App.372, 802 A.2d 170 (2002).
91
 Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 15, § 1207 provides:  “The commissioner shall provide civil union license and certificate 
forms to all town and county clerks.  The commissioner shall keep a record of all civil unions.”
92
 Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 15, § 1204 provides:  “Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, 
protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, 
policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage.  A party to a 
civil union shall be included in any definition or use of the terms ‘spouse,’ ‘family,’ ‘immediate family,’ 
‘dependent,’  ‘next of kin,’ and other terms that denote the spousal relationship, as those terms are used 
throughout the law.”
93
 Vt. Stat.Ann. tit. 15, § 1206 provides:  “The family court shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings 
relating to the dissolution of civil unions.  The dissolution of civil unions shall follow the same procedures 
and be subject to the same substantive rights and obligations that are involved in the dissolution of marriage 
in accordance with chapters of this title, including any residency requirements.”
provide for the dissolution of the unions and has created a system to administer its new 
law.  This is how the Connecticut court handled the issue, although the court also found 
that the union violated the strong public policy of the state.94  A court in New York might 
conclude that although the policy favors same-sex unions for many purposes, its family 
law court is not set up to process the dissolution of these unions.  
The other issue concerns the substantive law that applies to the dissolution 
proceeding.  In a typical dissolution proceeding, the state that hears the dissolution 
applies its own law to the proceeding.  If the court has the jurisdictional authority to 
adjudicate the case, it follows that it has the authority to apply its own substantive law to 
the dissolution proceeding.95  This is the tradition in divorce jurisprudence followed by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Williams I and Williams II, two famous cases from divorce 
law jurisprudence.96
Given the unique nature of the civil union, it is also possible that a court would accept 
jurisdiction of the dissolution proceeding but choose to apply the dissolution law of 
Vermont to the substantive issues presented.
Another way to view the arrangement is as a contract rather than a marriage.  The 
parties might claim that the terms, though identical to a marriage contract in Vermont 
including an obligation to pay support and to provide for other marriage-like benefits, in 
fact create a contract rather than a marriage.  A marriage is a contract sanctioned by the 
state and entered into by the parties to the marriage. 
94 See Rosengarten v. Downes, 71 Conn.App 372, 802 A.2d 170 (2002).
95
 Katherine Spaht and Symeon Symeonides, Covenant Marriage and the Law of Conflicts of Laws, 32 
CREIGHTON LAW REV. 1085 (1999).  In this article, the authors make the case for application of Louisiana 
state law in a different state’s proceedings to dissolve a covenant marriage entered into in Louisiana.  The 
authors make the point that Louisiana has an interest in having its divorce law applied when its law creates 
heightened responsibilities and heightened burdens for those who marry under the covenant marriage laws.  
96 See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (Williams I) and Williams v North Carolina, 325 
U.S. 226 (1945) (Williams II).
Even if a state court is unwilling to sanction the same-sex union as a marriage, the 
court may nevertheless be willing to recognize the validity of the contract that has been 
created between the two parties.  The contracting party John wants the terms of his civil 
contract in Vermont honored in New York.  Those terms include a term that requires the 
couple to dissolve the civil union before entering another one.  They also agreed to 
dissolve the union in the same way that marriage is dissolved in Vermont.  If the New 
York court considers this a contract dispute, it may enforce the contract like it would any 
other contract between unmarried cohabitants.97  If New York courts enforce contracts 
between unmarried gay and lesbian couples, a court would likely enforce the terms of this 
couple’s contract as it would any other couple’s contract.  The fact that the contract is 
tantamount to marriage in Vermont does not detract from the agreement’s inherent 
contractual character.  
2.  Enforcement of a foreign judgment from Vermont
PROBLEM:
Assume in this problem that instead of John moving to New York after the parties 
separated, but before their union was dissolved, he moved to New York after a court 
in Vermont dissolved their union.  The court ordered support paid by John to Joseph 
of $1000 per month.  John leaves, moves to New York, and falls behind in his 
payments.  Joseph seeks to enforce the judgments for past due support in a New York 
court.  Will the New York court enforce the judgments against John?
97
 For a discussion of the recognition of same-sex couples as entitled to the contract remedies available to 
opposite sex couples, see Carol S. Bruch, Cohabitation in the Common Law Countries a Decade after 
Marvin:  Settled In or Moving Ahead?,  22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717 (1989).
Once the Vermont union has been dissolved by a Vermont court and the support 
obligation has been reduced to final judgment, it will be more difficult for a sister-state’s 
court to refuse to enforce the judgment on the basis of the judgment violating a public 
policy of that state.  Enforcement of judgments across state lines is the obligation of a 
sister state pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  Sister states have enacted 
uniform legislation, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act,98 to harness this 
enforcement power among the states.  The language in the Act speaks of an obligee as 
“an individual to whom a duty of support is or is alleged to be owed or in whose favor a 
support order has been issued or a judgment determining parentage has been rendered.”99
The Act does not restrict its jurisdiction to married couples or to same-sex couples 
although the family law in many states makes that distinction.  But in the context of this 
case, the court in New York will be bound to follow the substantive law of Vermont.  
Since Vermont recognizes the obligation to pay support for same-sex couples, the court 
should enforce the support order under the uniform law regardless of the substantive law 
of Vermont.  
Arguably, the Defense of Marriage Act provides an exception for issues regarding 
enforcement of same-sex marriages across state lines, but these are issues of Full Faith 
and Credit rather than of conflict of laws.   The questions include whether DOMA applies 
to a civil union, not a marriage, and to enforcement of a money judgment against a party 
98
 Congress required all states to enact The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act by January 1, 1998.  42 
U.S.C. § 666 (f).  Provisions of the Act give the state that issued the original spousal support order  
“continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal support order throughout the existence of the support 
obligation.”  Once the support order is registered in the responding state, the tribunal of that state is 
required to recognize and enforce, and not modify the order of the issuing tribunal.  See Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act, 9 ULA 235 (Part 1B).  
99 Id. at .
who it has already been determined owes the money to the other party.100  Issues 
regarding the constitutionality of the Act’s restriction of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
also remain to be determined.  Assuming that DOMA is constitutional, it appears that a 
state could refuse to enforce a support order entered against a party in a same-sex union.
Another argument against enforcement could be raised in this context: if a state has 
enacted a mini-DOMA law stating that its public policy is against enforcement of same-
sex marriage, that local law presents a conflict with the law of Vermont in this context.   
A number of jurisdictions have enacted laws stating that “marriage is a contract that may 
be entered into only between a man and a woman.”101
Whether or not enforcement of the out-of-state support order presents a conflict 
involves an interpretation of the state statute.  The statute specifically addresses marriage 
as a contract between a male and a female; the Vermont Civil Union law is different in 
that it involves a contract that is regarded as different from marriage.  Maybe there is no 
conflict if one interprets that law in that way.
On the other hand, the Vermont law creates all the same rights and responsibilities of 
marriage in the civil union.  Even though we don’t call a civil union a marriage, it is for 
all practical purposes very much like a marriage.  A state court might view the mini-
DOMA statute as being in conflict with the state uniform enforcement of support law.  
Given state interests, it might construe the mini-DOMA law as stating public policy that 
prevents the court from enforcing a support order from a Vermont civil union.  The 
100 See Lewis A. Silverman, Vermont Civil Unions, Full Faith and Credit, and Marital Status, 89 KY. L. J. 
1075, 1096-1098 (2001).  The author discusses the issues raised by the adoption of DOMA.
101 See Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 572-1 (Michie 1999).  That statute provides that, “In order to make valid the 
marriage contract, which shall be only between a man and a woman….” Wash. Rev. Code Ann.                  
§ 26.04.010 (West Supp. 2001) provides “Marriage is a civil contract between a male and a female who 
have each attained the age of eighteen years, and who are otherwise capable.”
counter argument is that the uniform law makes it clear that once an out-of-state support 
order is presented for enforcement in a responding court, the court does not have 
discretion to change the terms of the support order or to modify it in any way.102  If the 
issuing tribunal has jurisdiction of the matter and has entered a support order, there 
should be no discretion on the part of the responding court concerning the enforcement of 
the order.  In that respect, it would seem that the responding state’s public policy 
objections to same-sex unions are irrelevant to the proceeding.
2a.  Enforcement of a foreign judgment brought by a third party  
PROBLEM
Assume a different problem involving enforcement of a judgment across state lines.  
Assume that when the parties divorced, the Vermont court ordered that John be 
responsible for consumer debt incurred by the parties during their union.  As a part of 
the dissolution order, John is ordered to pay several thousands of dollars of debt.  
John has moved to New York, and has not repaid the consumer debt.  The retail 
establishment gets a judgment against John and moves to enforce the judgment in 
New York.  Will the New York court enforce the judgment against John for 
repayment of the consumer debt?
This case presents some of the same issues presented in the previous problem about 
enforcement of out-of-state judgments.  The same analysis mentioned above applies to 
the analysis of this problem.  
102 See footnote supra.  Section 603 that states that the tribunal shall recognize and enforce, but may 
not modify, a registered order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction.
As a matter of Full Faith and Credit, and under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments Act, the enforcement may be required by one state court of another’s 
judgment against a debtor now residing in another state.103  The Uniform Act streamlines 
a requirement that states enforce sister-state judgments as required by the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause.104  The Act implements the requirement of the Constitution; with or 
without the Act, the states have no choice but to enforce sister-state judgments in their 
state courts.105
The creditor seeking enforcement relied on Vermont law in obtaining a judgment 
against the debtor.  When the court issued the judgment, the judgment creditor was 
entitled to rely on the effectiveness of that judgment and was entitled to enforce that 
judgment in another state.106  If the creditor cannot do that, its debtor may be able to 
avoid the effectiveness of the judgment by traveling out of Vermont.  That does not seem 
to be a desirable result nor is it consistent with the constitutional and uniform law 
relevant to this issue.
When a creditor seeks the enforcement on a debt judgment in a proceeding in a sister 
state, a sister-state’s court may not refuse to enforce the judgment against the debtor even 
if the basis for the debt is contrary to the public policy of the sister state.  For instance, if 
a debt incurred through gambling is created in Nevada, reduced to judgment in Nevada, 
and enforcement is sought in Alabama, Alabama courts must enforce the judgment even 
103
 The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act requires the states to enforce foreign judgments in 
the same way that they enforce state judgments. See Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 1964 
Revised Act, 13 ULA 155 (2002).  Section 2 of the Act provides that “A copy of any foreign judgment 
authenticated in accordance with the act of Congress or the statutes of this state may be filed in the office of 
the Clerk of any District Court of any city or county of this state.  The Clerk shall treat the foreign 
judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the District Court of any city or county of this state.”    
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
though gambling is against the public policy and law of the state.107  Therefore, even if 
the court in New York had a strong public policy against recognition of same-sex unions, 
that public policy should not be raised in the context of an enforcement of foreign 
judgments proceeding.  The public policy issue is moot because it cannot be raised when 
the judgment has already been determined against the debtor.
In our case involving the judgment debtor of the creditor who is relying on Vermont 
law to collect a judgment against the debtor now living in New York, New York should 
enforce the judgment as it would any other judgment.  The conflict-of-law issue is not 
relevant because the public policy of the two states’ laws are not at issue in this context; 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Uniform Enforcement of Judgments Act require 
one state to enforce judgments from another state.
Imagine that the judgment creditor seeks enforcement of the judgment in a 
jurisdiction that has enacted a mini-DOMA law that declares state policy to be against 
recognition of same-sex marriage.  If the court is not free to consider the public policy 
issues in the context of an enforcement action in that state’s court, the statute should have 
no relevance to the proceeding.  The court would be required to enforce the action 
regardless of express state policy against same-sex relationships.
107 See Holiday Casino, Inc. v. Breedwell, 581 So.2d 474 (Ala. 1991).  The Full Faith and Credit Clause 
compelled enforcement of a valid Nevada judgment against an Alabama resident for gambling debts even 
though no suit could have been brought and maintained in an Alabama court on a gambling debt since 
gambling is illegal and against the public policy of Alabama.  Other cases have held similarly on this point.  
See GNLV Corp. v. Jackson, 736 SW2d 893 (Tex. App-Waco 1987), error denied; Hargreaves v. Greate 
Bay Hotel & Casino, 357 SE2d 305, 182 Ga App 852 (1987); Smith v. State, 630 So.2d 1101 (Fla. 1993); 
Conquistador Hotel Corp. v. Fortino, 298 NW2d, 99 Wis. 2d 16 (Wis. App. 1980). 
     2b.  Enforcement of a foreign state custody order
       PROBLEM:
Assume that John and Joseph adopted two children during their civil union.  At the 
dissolution of the union, the Vermont court ordered that Joseph be the primary 
custodial parent for the two children.  John is given visitation rights that include an 
every-other-weekend visit along with regular visits during the week.  John is also 
given a six-week visit time in the summers.  John has now moved out of state, and 
during one summer visit in New York, he refuses to return the children to Joseph’s 
home in Vermont.   If Joseph seeks enforcement of the Vermont court custody decree 
in New York, how will the New York court respond?
Enforcement of foreign custody orders are governed by the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act or the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 
uniform laws designed to provide consistency in child custody decisions from state to 
state.  Once a state court determines that it has jurisdiction over the determination of 
custody, enforcement issues are to be determined by that state court unless that state loses 
jurisdiction over the custody dispute.108
Given that a Vermont court makes a custody decision when the civil union is 
dissolved that gives custody of the child to one of the partners, the New York court is 
obligated to give effect to the Vermont decree.  By giving that decree effect, the court is 
108 See Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
Act, 9 ULA 261, 9 ULA 649 (Part 1A).  The Acts both provide that “courts of this State shall recognize and 
enforce an initial or modification decree of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under 
statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this Act or which was made under factual 
circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the Act, so long as the decree has not been modified 
in accordance with jurisdictional standards substantially similar to those of this Act.”  Section 13 of the 
UCCJA. 
recognizing the legitimacy of the union made in Vermont, and it is also recognizing the 
authority of the Vermont court to adjudicate custody between the civil union partners.  
The command of the law makes it very difficult for the state court to ignore the order 
entered in Vermont that determined the custody at the end of the civil union.  By 
following the law, the court is tangentially recognizing the civil union and legal 
recognition given to same-sex partnerships in Vermont.  And the court has little choice in 
the matter.109
Once a state has enacted law that recognizes marital rights for same-sex partners, the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and the Uniform Family Support Enforcement Act 
mandate enforcement of rights stemming from that recognition in other states.  To that 
extent, a state cannot avoid the impact of another state’s liberalization of its marriage law 
to include same-sex couples. 
3.  Recognition of same-sex union in the context of a wrongful death action    
PROBLEM:
Assume a different fact situation.  Doris and Denise reside in Vermont and enter into 
a civil union in Vermont.  Several years later, they move to Oregon and reside in 
Oregon for several years before Doris is killed in Oregon in an automobile accident.  
Denise brings a wrongful death action in an Oregon court against the driver who 
killed her partner.  Is it likely that the Oregon court will determine that Denise has 
standing to bring the wrongful death action?
This fact pattern is different from the previous ones in that the status of the parties’ is 
not the main issue before the court but is incidental to the main issue.  In this case, the 
definition of the parties’ relationship will impact whether or not Denise can be considered 
a spouse for purposes of the wrongful death statute.110  Courts may be more flexible in 
these kinds of cases.111  One commentator has observed that, “Marriage has many 
incidents beyond licit sexual congress—a spousal share of the marital estate upon the 
death of a spouse, pension rights, health and insurance benefits, to mention a few.  
Adjudication of these incidents may raise the necessity of resolving the validity of the 
marriage and, in turn, triggers the application vel non of the public policy exception.  So 
long as the adjudication of the incident does not compel the court to bless an odious 
union, public policy will not be a bar.112
If the state has no statutory law that addresses this question, the court will be faced 
again with an examination of the policy interests of the state and whether recognition of 
the marriage does violence to those interests.  The court may look at it differently than if 
the court were asked to recognize the status of the parties.  The parties are no longer 
living in a civil union; one of the parties has died.  One of the parties is asking the court 
to treat her as a spouse and allow her to be in the position that she and her partner 
intended.  She has been living in a relationship in which she may have derived her 
support from her partner; now that her partner is gone, she is in need of support.  The 
wrongful death statute is intended to provide that kind of support.
110
 Oregon’s wrongful death statute provides:  “When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or 
omission of another, the personal representative of the decedent, for the benefit of the decedent’s surviving 
spouse,….” OR. REV. STAT. § 30.020 (2001).
111
 Symeon Symeonides et al, CONFLICTS OF LAW:  AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL, 429,  
provides:  “The Restatement (Second) draws a distinction between questions of ‘pure’ status, such as the 
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The purpose for the lawsuit may make it easier for the court to construe the public policy 
in a direction that allows for inclusion of the partner as a spouse.  The relationship has 
ended and the court can focus on the policy of the wrongful death statute.  In Langan v. 
St. Vincent’s Hospital, the court concluded that the wrongful death statute should be 
construed broadly to include as a spouse a surviving partner from a Vermont civil union.  
In doing so, the court considered the policy of the law in New York as favorable to same-
sex unions, and from that, decided it is reasonable to expand the definition of spouse.113
Although the purpose behind the wrongful death statute is to compensate the 
surviving partner, not to recognize the status of the partnership as a marriage, a court may 
nevertheless find that the policy of the state is not supportive of including a same-sex 
partner within the protection of the wrongful death statute.  The state may have a specific 
statute that makes recognition squarely against state law, or it may be clear that the 
“degree of moral opprobrium is strong because of the presence of abhorrent conduct.”114
4.  Inheritance rights of a same-sex partner
PROBLEM:
Assume the same facts as above except that Doris dies of natural causes and leaves a 
large estate.  Doris had not written a will.  Denise petitions the court in Oregon to be 
named as a spouse entitled to inherit her estate.  Will the Oregon court recognize 
Denise as a spouse?
113
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The same public policy issues must be resolved as were presented by the wrongful 
death case.  Again, the court is not being asked to recognize the civil union, but to allow 
Denise to recover as though she was a spouse of her partner who died intestate.  
In deciding whether or not to allow Denise standing to recover, one must first identify 
the conflict between the law of Vermont and that of Oregon.  In Vermont, Denise is 
considered to have the same rights as a spouse at her partner’s death.115  In Oregon, the 
partner does not qualify as a spouse or surviving relative, and would not be entitled to an 
intestate portion of the estate.116
In order to determine whether or not Denise qualifies as a taker of the intestate estate, 
a court must first resolve the conflict in the law of the two states.  The case of In Re 
May’s Estate117 and the case of In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate118 are good examples of 
how this conflicts issue might be resolved.  The second case, Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate, 
involves a man who at the time of his death in California, was legally married to two 
women, both of whom lived in India.  Both wives petitioned the court to share the estate 
of the deceased and the court held that it would not violate the public policy of California 
to allow both wives to be treated as intestate heirs and to share in the decedent’s estate.  
The court said:  “The decision of the trial court was influenced by the rule of ‘public 
policy’; but that rule, it would seem, would apply only if the decedent had attempted to 
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cohabit with his two wives in California.  Where only the question119 of descent of 
property is involved, ‘public’ is not affected.…’  ‘Public policy’ would not be affected by 
dividing the money equally between the two wives, particularly since there is no contest 
between them and they are the only interested parties.”   And so the court proceeded to 
divide the funds equally between the two surviving spouses.
As a matter of conflict of laws, the court accepted the marriage law of India to the 
extent that the law accepted the practice of having two wives to inherit property at the 
death of the husband.  The court said that both wives fit into the definition of wife in the 
intestate statute and the court construed the statute to allow for the inclusion of two 
wives.
In resolving the conflict in the laws of the two states in this case, there are similar 
public policy issues at stake as were at stake in the California case.  Even though 
Oregon’s law and public policy does not support same-sex unions as marriages or as civil 
unions, the court is not being called upon to sanction the relationship.  Rather, the court is 
being asked to recognize at death the right of the partner who has depended on the 
decedent for support to receive support out of the decedent’s estate.  The issue at stake 
does not require the court to sanction or to accept the same-sex partnership as being 
equivalent to marriage; it calls on the court to recognize the need the surviving partner 
has for support and nothing more. 
If the same-sex partner prevails in this case, the consequences are that the court 
accepts the civil union law of Vermont, but construes the language in the Oregon 
intestate succession law to define spouse as including “same-sex” partner.  The court 
would have to be willing to broadly construe the terms of the statute.  Since the parties 
119 Id. at 188 P.2d 499 at 502, 83 Cal.App.2d 256, 261-262.
are Oregon domiciliaries and have made Oregon their home, Oregon’s law is applicable 
to the determination of the rights of a surviving partner.  (Had the parties been in Oregon 
for a short time, or had the parties continued to reside in Vermont, but had been visiting 
in Oregon, Vermont’s law would seem to be the applicable law for determining intestate 
succession rights.)
To convince a court to do that, one would have to focus on the purpose of the 
intestate laws.  The Oregon intestate succession law provides that the surviving spouse of 
a decedent inherits all of the decedent’s estate unless the decedent leaves issue that are 
not issue of the surviving spouse.120  The purpose of the intestate law is to provide for the 
passing of the decedent’s estate when the decedent did not provide for division of the 
estate in a will.   Studies have found that most married people want their estates to pass to 
their spouses.121  Because the closest surviving person in this case is Denise, the domestic 
partner, it seems clear that the decedent wants the property to pass to her partner Denise.  
Although it is apparent that the domestic partner desired her property to pass to her 
partner, whether the court would construe the statute in this way is difficult to say.  
Another way to reach this result is to change the statute to include domestic partners 
within the class of those who can inherit from the decedent.122
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5. Surviving same-sex partner and spouse
PROBLEM:
Sue and Sarah entered into a civil union in Vermont.  Several years later, Sarah left 
Vermont to live in Connecticut.  While living in Connecticut, Sarah met Adam and 
fell in love with him.  Adam and Sarah were married in Connecticut.  Shortly after 
their marriage, Sarah was killed in an automobile accident.  When Adam brings a 
wrongful death action in a Connecticut court, Sue intervenes and asks the court to 
name her as the surviving spouse for purposes of the wrongful death action.  What is 
the court likely to do?
In addition to the other issues raised, this problem raises the issue of how a court will 
handle the simultaneous marriage and civil union of a decedent who dies leaving both 
parties as surviving partners.
The Vermont Civil Union Law provides in Section 1202 that, “For a civil union to be 
established in Vermont, it shall be necessary that the parties to a civil union satisfy all of 
the following criteria:  1) Not be a party to another civil union or a marriage.”123  Once 
Sarah and Sue registered their civil union in Vermont, they fell under Vermont law 
requiring that their union be dissolved before another union or marriage can be created.  
Had Sue filed a wrongful death claim in Vermont, the court would honor that claim as it 
is clear in the law that the wrongful death action is available to Sue to pursue and 
Vermont would not recognize a later marriage entered into in Connecticut before the civil 
union was dissolved.  
Probate Code now provides that “the surviving spouse or the surviving domestic partner” is entitled to 
inherit an intestate share.  See West’s Ann. Cal. Probate Code, § 6401 (2003).
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Connecticut may view these issues differently.  If Connecticut recognizes the out-of-
state civil union, it may also recognize the restriction in the law that regards the civil 
union as a monogamous relationship that must be dissolved before another union or a 
marriage can replace it.  On the other hand, if Connecticut does not recognize the union, 
the court will not recognize the restriction in the law.  The only valid union is the 
marriage entered into with Adam.  Adam will be entitled to make the claim under the 
wrongful death statute. 
If Connecticut does not recognize the civil union entered into in Vermont, it is 
possible that both Sue and Adam could proceed with wrongful death actions in Vermont 
and Connecticut.  Either or both states could process their action as if the other state did 
not have the authority its law gives it to adjudicate the wrongful death actions.  That 
result would not work efficiently since there is a finite sum available for the wrongful 
death action and it should be distributed fairly to those who qualify for the recovery.  
One approach might be to treat either partner as though that partner is a putative 
spouse and entitled to a share of the spouse’s share of the wrongful death claim.  The 
putative spouse doctrine is designed to protect the interests of an innocent spouse who 
believes that he or she is legally married to another, but it later turns out, that the 
marriage is not valid.124  This doctrine may not work well in the context of a case like this 
if either of the partners knows of the other partner and knows that partner has a legal 
relationship with his or her partner.  If a state does not accept the validity of the
relationship created by the Vermont civil union law, it is unlikely to follow the putative-
spouse doctrine to protect the interests of that partner.
124 LESLIE HARRIS AND LEE TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 192, Second Edition (2000).  A putative spouse is 
one whose marriage is legally invalid but who has engaged in (1) a marriage ceremony or a solemnization, 
on the (2) good faith belief in the validity of the marriage.  
If Vermont is the forum that considers the wrongful death claim, it may also balk at 
applying a doctrine that dilutes the effectiveness of its own law, but the doctrine is 
designed to provide protection to an innocent spouse who doesn’t know of the existence 
of another spouse or someone who is entitled to a share of the deceased spouse’s estate.  
It might be consistent with Vermont’s public policy to provide this kind of protection to a 
partner, no matter what the gender of the partner.  
6.  Limiting a partner’s ability to marry during civil union 
PROBLEM:
Assume the same facts as above, except that when Sue learned that Sarah planned to 
marry Adam, she filed a lawsuit in Connecticut seeking to enjoin the county from 
issuing a marriage license to Sarah and Adam since Sarah is in a civil union with Sue 
that has not been terminated.  Is the court in Connecticut likely to enjoin issuance of a 
marriage license?
In assessing the likelihood that a Connecticut court would enjoin a county from 
issuing a marriage license, the question is one of whether the court accepts the Vermont 
law that makes it necessary to dissolve the civil contract before entering into a marriage.  
The policy interests mentioned earlier in the context of the other problems apply here, but 
there are other issues to consider as well.  If Connecticut takes the position that the 
marriage can go forward without dissolution of the Vermont civil union, it is sanctioning 
a relationship that will not be recognized in Vermont.  The two states will recognize one 
relationship, but not the other.  This situation undermines the record keeping and 
credibility of state-sanctioned relationships.  Not only are the two parties affected, but 
also the state and those who may rely on state records may be affected.
Assume that a creditor in Connecticut relies on the fact that Sarah is married to Adam 
and loans the couple money to purchase a home based on the incomes of both of them.  
Subsequent to that time, a creditor from Vermont seeks to levy on property that Sarah 
owns.  During their civil union, Sue and Sarah incurred the debt.   Even though the 
couple no longer lives together, they have not dissolved their civil union and both are 
responsible for the debt’s repayment.
To the extent that a state’s failure to recognize the Vermont civil union law impacts 
the rights of third parties, it threatens to undermine the reliance that creditors and others 
may have on state marriage laws.  
7.  Effect of civil union on a registered partnership
PROBLEM:
Assume that when Sarah left Sue, she moved to California where she met Sherri.  
Sherri and Sarah plan to enter into a registered domestic partnership in California.          
When Sue finds out about their plan, she files an action in California to enjoin the 
county from issuing the registration.  What is the California court likely to do in that 
case?  
California has adopted a domestic partnership registration law.  This law falls short of 
the protection offered by Vermont’s civil union law, but the domestic partnership law 
provides some of the protection that marriage provides to those living in a same-sex 
partnership.125
There are significant differences in the laws of the two jurisdictions because Vermont 
intends its civil union to be as much like marriage as it can even though the civil union is 
not officially considered a marriage.  California’s law is not intended to create a 
marriage; the domestic partnership law offers different protection to the parties.  Both 
laws do share the requirement that a person entering into either a civil union or a 
domestic partnership must not be either married or in another civil union or domestic 
partnership.126
In resolving the conflict in the laws of Vermont and California, the issue is how will 
California regard the civil union.  It is not a marriage, and it is not a domestic partnership, 
but it is more like marriage than a domestic partnership.  Although California has enacted 
the domestic partnership law, it has also enacted law that makes it clear that California 
regards marriage as a relationship that is one between a man and a woman.127  If a 
California court recognizes the Vermont civil union and enters an order enjoining the 
county from registering the domestic partnership in California, is it recognizing an out-
of-state marriage between a same-sex couple?  Since Vermont law is clear that the civil 
union is not a marriage, a California court could recognize the out-of-state civil union, 
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and at the same time avoid a conflict with the California law that makes clear what 
California policy is on same-sex marriage.
Another way to look at this issue is to consider what the court would do if it were 
faced with a California domestic partnership that had not been terminated and now one of 
the partners was seeking to enter into another partnership before terminating the previous 
partnership.  The California law is clear on this point; a partnership may not be entered 
into when a partner is already in a domestic partnership that has not yet been terminated.  
If the California court did not treat the Vermont civil union in the same way that it treated 
a party who is in a domestic partnership, an argument could be made that the out-of-state 
partner is being treated differently than the same-sex partnership created in California.  
The difference in treatment may be very difficult to justify.
California has recently passed a law entitled The California Domestic Partner Rights 
and Responsibilities Act that extends the rights and responsibilities of marriage to 
persons registered as domestic partners on or after January 1, 2005.128  The new law 
provides that,  “(A) legal union of two persons of the same sex, other than a marriage, 
that was validly formed in another jurisdiction, and that is substantially equivalent to a 
domestic partnership as defined in this part, shall be recognized as a valid domestic 
partnership in this state, regardless of whether it bears the name domestic partnership.”129
This provision specifically gives recognition to same-sex partnerships created and 
sanctioned in another jurisdiction.  The provision stops short of recognition of same-sex 
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marriages, and given the statute that defines marriage as a heterosexual union, it is clear 
that the law is designed to stop short of recognizing foreign same-sex marriages.
Part III:  International Conflicts involving Recognition of Same-Sex Unions
     As mentioned at the beginning of this article, several countries have recently legalized 
same-sex marriage.  Canada, The Netherlands and Belgium have changed their laws to 
permit same-sex marriage.  In these countries the law now includes same-sex couples 
within the marriage statute, so they have been given the same ability to marry as 
heterosexual couples.
       In The Netherlands, there is a restriction in the law regarding who may marry.  The 
right to marry for same-sex couples is restricted to couples that are citizens or residents.  
Other Northern European countries that provide for registration and a civil-union type of 
recognition also restrict the availability of the laws to their own citizens and residents.  
Reciprocal recognition is likely in other countries with similar laws.130
Canada’s approach to marriage and recognition issues is apparently quite different.  
Canada’s law does not have a residency requirement; it can be expected that numbers of 
people from outside of Canada will go to Canada to marry.131  The fact that Canada’s law 
has no residency requirement for marriage creates the likelihood that a number of people 
from the United States will travel to Canada to marry and then return to the United States 
to live in a marital relationship.  The other part of this scenario is that a number of 
130 YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES, pp. 238-239.
131 THE OREGONIAN, June 17, Canadian Law will recognize gay marriages, states:  “Canada follows in the 
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on the United States. The nations share a long, open border and English as a common language, but Canada 
has no residency requirement for marriage.  Only a few U.S. gay couples have taken advantage of 
expanded marriage laws in the Netherlands because of its long residency requirement, and Belgium will 
allow marriages of foreign couples only from countries that allow such unions.”
Canadians will marry in Canada and then travel to the U.S. and expect to have their 
marriages honored in the United States.
The issue of acceptance of the foreign marriages presents very similar issues to those 
that we have already discussed in the context of interstate conflicts involving state 
marriage laws.  American courts will consider them in the same way that they will 
consider the issues involving interstate conflicts.  In the very few court cases involving 
foreign polygamous marriages, we can see that courts were willing to accept the validity 
of the unions to provide benefits and protection to the spouses.  Recognition of the status 
of the parties as being married is a different issue the courts have not addressed.  Courts 
would probably be much less likely to recognize the status of the relationship when it is 
apparent that the marriage is repugnant to the public policy of a state.
In other words, our state courts will analyze the problems of recognition of a foreign 
marriage very similarly to the way these problems have been analyzed for interstate 
conflicts.  Americans who travel to Canada to marry can expect to find the same issues 
awaiting them on their return to the United States.  Canadians can expect to encounter 
those same issues to the extent they seek to litigate issues regarding the validity of their 
marriages in American courts.
For Europeans and Americans who marry or enter into a same-sex union in Europe 
and seek recognition of that union in the U.S., it is likely to be even more difficult.  Most 
of the European countries that have enacted same-sex marriage or registered partnerships 
have restricted who can qualify for marriage and have also limited the effect of the 
partnerships outside the home jurisdiction.  For instance, the Netherlands law states that 
at least one of the parties must be domiciled or a permanent resident in order to qualify 
for marriage.132 The Parliament made the benefit unavailable to parties who are 
domiciled in other countries.  In part, this may be because the Parliament realized that 
few other countries will recognize the marriage, so it made it available only to people 
who will likely be living in the Netherlands.  The parliamentary committee recognized 
that there would be a problem of recognition of gay marriages in other countries, 
“something the future spouses of the same sex will have to take into account… However, 
this problem of ‘limping legal relations’ also exists for registered partners, as well as for 
cohabiting same-sex partners who have not contracted a registered partnership or 
marriage.”133
To some extent this problem of recognition is less significant in Europe than in the 
United States because European law regarding the validity of marriage begins from a 
different point:  the capacity to marry is determined not by the law of the place of 
celebration, but rather by the “personal law of the parties, the law of the parties’ domicile 
or nationality.”134 In Europe, citizens do not expect to be able to travel to other countries 
and marry under law that is different from their national law.  
The issue of marriage validity for foreign domiciliaries going to a country that 
accepts same-sex marriage in order to marry under the law of that state will arise less 
often because the legal culture in Europe accepts that domiciliaries must marry according 
to the law of the state where they reside.  They may not avoid that law by going to a 
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different country to marry under that country’s more lenient laws.  In the rare case where 
it does happen, a country in Europe will examine its public policy to decide whether or 
not to recognize the marriage made in a different country.135
But issues of validity of Canadian marriages between Americans and between 
Canadians who move to the United States are certain to arise.  The culture in Canada is 
more like the culture in the United States in that the new law does not include a residency 
requirement for marrying.  In all likelihood, many Americans will journey to Canada to 
take advantage of this new law.
When they return to the United States to live, the same issues that have been raised in 
the context of interstate marriage-law conflicts will come up in the context of this 
international conflict.  And when Canadians who married under the Canadian law move 
to the United States after marrying in Canada, recognition issues will arise when they 
wish to divorce, when a partner dies, etc.
These issues raise the same problems that are raised by the interstate conflicts cases 
that we have discussed previously.  But since they are cases that arise from out of the 
country, they don’t trigger application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  For example, 
although sister-state judgments are entitled to full faith and credit throughout this 
country, foreign judgments are not entitled to the same recognition across international 
lines.136  Nevertheless, foreign judgments will usually be recognized and enforced unless 
135 Id. at 998-999.  The author states that in many countries, same-sex marriages would not be accepted.  
Rather, they would be seen as violating the public policy of their countries.  He mentions a survey of family 
law specialists conducted by FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY that asked students of family law from 16 different 
countries whether they thought their countries would recognize a same-sex marriage that was legal in 
another country.  The results showed that some thought that same-sex marriage would not be recognized or 
would be recognized for limited purposes while a few thought that it would be recognized for all purposes.
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the original claim is repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the 
State where enforcement is sought.137  One can imagine that a state court might take the 
position that enforcement of a dissolution judgment for a same-sex couple is repugnant to 
its fundamental notions of what is decent and just, and the court would balk at enforcing 
the judgment.  
When the issue is one of recognition of a foreign marriage that would not be 
recognized in the United States, the issue is one of recognition and enforcement of 
foreign law that makes marriage legal between two people of the same sex.  Reasoning 
through the conflicts resolution issues are no different than reasoning through those 
issues when the court is faced with an interstate conflict.138  A state court will consider 
the same issues it considers when faced with an interstate conflict.
In summary, the conflicts issues will likely be resolved similarly in the international 
context as they are in the interstate context.  
Part IV.  Conclusion
Marriage law is evolving.  Part of that evolution involves acceptance of same-sex 
couples into the institution.  At this point, same-sex marriage has been accepted in two 
western European countries and in Canada.  In Vermont and in Western Europe the 
be expected to arise where effect will be denied a foreign nation judgment rendered in circumstances in 
which a sister State judgment would be entitled to full faith and credit.” (Citation omitted.)
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concept of an enduring same-sex relation has been sanctioned in civil partnership laws 
that offer most, if not all, of the protection of marriage.  It remains to be seen how 
Massachusetts will fashion its legally recognized equivalent to marriage for same-sex 
partners.  In other American and western European countries, same-sex partners are 
protected by laws that give the partners many of the rights of marriage.
As this change in family law develops, conflicts between the laws of states and 
countries undoubtedly will occur.  
Interstate conflicts will be resolved following the principles of the Full Faith & Credit 
Clause.  The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and other state law will also be important 
in deciding the interstate conflicts issues.  Many states have enacted mini DOMAs that 
make it clear that state courts are prohibited from recognizing out-of-state same-sex 
marriages.  A liberal interpretation of these laws may also limit recognition of same-sex 
partnership laws.
For those states that have not adopted law that restricts recognition of out-of-state 
same-sex unions, it remains to be seen how these states will resolve the conflicts of law.
How a state resolves this issue depends in great measure on the state’s public policy 
regarding same-sex unions.  If the state considers such unions repugnant to its public 
policy, the state will not recognize the marriages or civil unions.  If the public policy is 
accepting of same-sex unions, it is more likely that the state will recognize the unions.  
A relevant factor in making this determination is what kind of issue is presented 
regarding the same-sex union.  If one of the partners is asking the court to adjudicate a 
divorce, the court may answer the question differently than if one of the partners is 
seeking to recover under a wrongful death statute.  The dissolution case forces the court 
to confront the validity of the same-sex marriage head-on while the validity of the 
marriage is a collateral issue in the wrongful death or intestate succession cases.  In the 
latter cases, a court will be more likely to give recognition to the same-sex union than 
when it must consider the validity of the marriage as the primary issue.  
For those cases that involve conflicts of law across international boundaries, the same 
principals of recognition and resolution apply.  Though United States state courts are not 
bound by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the resolution of the international conflicts 
cases is likely to be similar to the resolution of the interstate cases.
As courts are called on to face these conflicts issues, the existence of the marriages 
and unions will push the courts in the direction of recognition of out-of-state unions valid 
where entered into.  The reason is that the fabric of our society depends upon the family; 
where the law of a jurisdiction has sanctioned the creation of a family and that family has 
lived together for a number of years, the family expects that its relationships will be 
honored by those called upon to consider issues related to its existence.  The expectation 
of the parties and the need for a law that allows for the creation of predictable and stable 
relationships will move us in the direction of recognition.  Once the door is opened a 
crack by the sanctioning of the same-sex relationships in some jurisdictions, it signals a 
broader acceptance of the relationships.
There is no doubt that the door has opened at least a crack and it is very likely that in 
the next several years we will see many issues involving the conflicts between state laws 
litigated in state courts.
